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Abstract 
Wearable embedded devices are in common use in the medical industry. In today’s 
society security is needed in just about every electronic device. However, these devices don't yet 
have many security standards. To prevent scenarios that involve unauthorized sources intruding 
on a device, a honeypot could be used as a secure lightweight (in terms of resource usage) 
addition to these medical devices. This project seeks to devise and implement a wearable 
honeypot to add security to a BAN (Body Area Network).  
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1 Introduction 
In this modern information age, wearable embedded devices (small sensors with 
microcontrollers equipped with wireless communication) have become common use in the 
medical industry [10]. More recently a consumer market has developed for these kinds of 
devices [9]. Wearable embedded devices connected to a basestation form a piconet (small 
network) called a BAN (Body Area Network AKA Body Sensor Network). Currently, most 
implementations of BANs are used by the medical industry because by attaching multiple 
sensors to someone, different medical stats can be gathered and then analyzed by a doctor in the 
treatment of a patient [1]. With the advent of products such as the Apple Watch, BANs are 
moving into broader consumer use. With small sensors, the user can usually maintain a normal 
lifestyle even with all the monitoring. A BAN is shown below in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Wireless BAN 
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The work to be presented here is built on a Bluetooth-based BAN system built on the 
Shimmer platform, and utilizes a BAN-PnP application-layer protocol [19]. The BAN has a 
basestation implemented as an Android app; the motes (node on sensor network) in the sensor 
network are Shimmer motes running TinyOS [1]. The BAN itself already provides a measurable 
hit to the performance of the motes [1]. This highlights the need for lightweight security 
protocols. This BAN is ideal for the purposes of this project as it is cross platform. It only 
requires a device to implement the BAN protocol on top of Bluetooth. Importantly this BAN is 
plug and play and basestation firmware does not need to be updated to accommodate new motes 
with previously unknown functionality [1]. Generally, these wireless devices are short ranged, 
however this does not shield users from attackers. Some of these medical devices in BANs could 
be harmful to the user if tampered with. 
Today security is needed in just about every electronic device, however BAN devices 
don't yet have many security standards. Standard security options are ill-suited to BANs because 
motes run on batteries and standard security solutions don’t take this into account. Standard 
security solutions include public key cryptography and block ciphers, which are great for desktop 
applications that need encryption. However these require a lot of computation to encrypt and 
decrypt messages. To prevent unauthorized sources from intruding on a device, a honeypot could 
be used as a lightweight addition to these medical devices.  
Honeypots are traps that are meant for attacker to attack. They are meant to be attacked 
so that someone can detect the presence of attackers or to gain more information about what 
kinds of attacks can be launched. Honeypots typically have a monitoring component. This allows 
a system designer to log and recreate exploits so that they can be patched [15]. Most of the time, 
when no threats are present, the honeypot requires little computation and therefore doesn’t use 
much battery power. Additionally, when a threat is detected heavier weight security measures 
(i.e. thorough packet sniffing and analysis) can be activated [14]. These heavier weight security 
measures would produce a significant drain on battery power if they were always active. 
Previous honeypots are mostly used in enterprise environments. These are typically set up 
connected to web servers, but are not supposed to be used for legitimate purposes, so only 
attackers interact with them.  
Recently, there have been groups working on mobile honeypots, which are essentially 
mobile versions (as in smart phones) of enterprise honeypots. A notable mobile honeypot, 
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HoneyDroid extensively monitors all communications in and out of the smart phone [5]. This 
was extended in HoneyDroid Extension to rooted smart phones [4]. These are not good in this 
case because they only apply to phones and the thorough communication analysis is battery 
intensive. Other mobile honeypots throw together existing honeypots [7] (so they don’t apply to 
BANs) or open up new avenues of attack by communicating with the Internet [6]. This honeypot 
is a new application, however many design principles will remain the same as traditional 
honeypots.  
This project sought to devise and implement a Wearable Honeypot to add security to a 
BAN. This honeypot system utilizes the basestation and some dedicated helper motes. They can 
communicate in the open or pass secret messages through an encrypted channel. The motes 
attract an attacker to interact with them by being the most active members of the BAN. The 
basestation knows what every single message the helper motes send it will be. To do this the 
honeypot deterministically synthesizes and streams accelerometer data. The basestation then 
verifies that the messages come as expected using a robust mechanism that allows for packet loss 
due to noisy networks. The helper motes also know what kinds of messages to expect from the 
basestation and when it should receive certain messages and not others. Since the basestation 
knows everything the helper motes will send and the helper motes know what kinds of messages 
they’re supposed to receive, the honeypot is able to know when an attacker starts to interact with 
it. This honeypot is one of if not the first honeypot solution for a BAN and computationally less 
expensive than using standard security solutions. This solution is able to secure a BAN for a 
longer period without impacting the battery life of the actual vital sensors the user has in their 
BAN.  
The discussion will start with background information about Bluetooth and Honeypots in 
section 2. In section 3 is the problem statement. This is followed by the motivations for coming 
up with a solution in section 4. Next is a discussion of the related works of mobile honeypots in 
section 5. Section 6 is the system model where the BAN the Wearable Honeypot is built on and 
the threat model are discussed. After that, the design of this honeypot is documented in section 7. 
The testing and results will be presented in section 8. Section 9 contains the conclusions of this 
project. Finally in section 10 improvements to the system and next steps are suggested. 
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2 Background 
 To understand this project, a basic understanding of Bluetooth and honeypots is required. 
Bluetooth is used as the means of communication within a BAN and operates at similar 
frequencies to Wi-Fi [27]. This project aims to design a honeypot to detect attacks on a BAN, 
which can be used to improve the security of the BAN. 
2.1 Bluetooth 
Bluetooth is a peer to peer communication protocol over a short range broadcast medium. 
In a Bluetooth piconet there is one master and up to 7 slaves. The master initiates activities and 
slaves respond to the master. To add a slave to the piconet a master must initiate pairing with a 
slave. When communicating, the master hops between 7 channels and the slaves hop between 
another 7 channels to send packets. Bluetooth operates in the 2.4-2.485 GHz data range [26]. 
Like TCP/IP, it has a stack to abstract out the hardware from the application programmer. 
Bluetooth is also widely used, despite known vulnerabilities and demonstrated hacks [22]. 
2.2 Honeypots 
A honeypot is best understood as a trap for attackers [14]. A honeypot is a system whose 
main purpose is to be attacked and compromised [5]. They monitor what goes in and what goes 
out of a system and are isolated, sometimes even running on a separate device. Some honeypots 
act as a decoy server that tries to compromise the attack and make themselves easy targets [16]. 
Honeypots can log all the incoming and outgoing packets so any vulnerability can be looked 
back on and analyzed for future study. There are scenarios where multiple different honeypots 
are used within a system. This is referred to as a honeynet [13]. 
There are many advantages to a honeypot.  One advantage is that a honeypot can record 
illegitimate activity. They are usually encrypted environments, and don’t require known attack 
signatures [15]. But like all things, the honeypot has some disadvantages too. For instance, there 
are some types of honeypots that can be used to attack other systems. Also, a honeypot cannot 
detect if other systems are being attacked. It only knows what is going in and out of its own 
system. A honeypot may also be detected by the attacker.  
2.2.1 Honeypot Classification 
While there are different applications and implementations of honeypots, they fall into a 
couple archetypes based upon purpose and implementation. Usually they’re either passive or 
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active. Passive honeypots collect data for analysis so exploits can become known and patched. 
Active honeypots detect threats and then do something in response. Honeypots are usually high 
interaction or low interaction. Low interaction honeypots recreate small subsets of a system, are 
generally simple, and not resource intensive. High interaction honeypots recreate entire 
subsystems resulting in higher security at the expense of maintenance costs. The extreme case of 
a high interaction honeypot would be a pure honeypot. In a pure honeypot the entire system is a 
honeypot, not a mix of simulated subsystems. In terms of purpose, there are two main types of 
classification, enterprise and research honeypots. Research honeypots are typically passive 
honeypots that collect extensive information about hacks and exploits and are generally used for 
research, hence the name. The other kind is an enterprise honeypot. Typically enterprise 
honeypots are low interaction, or made with multiple low interaction implementations. This is 
for practicality purposes because they are easier to deploy and maintain. After all they are made 
for production environments.  
3 Problem Statement 
 Standard security solutions involve cryptography, which can be computationally 
intensive. Given that the security solution must be cross platform, security options are further 
reduced to standard block ciphers or standard public key ciphers. Most available for TinyOS is 
the AES block cipher. This would have to be used in an operating mode such as cipher block 
chaining to be effective, not just straight encryption. This adds even more to the computational 
overhead. 
The challenge of this project is to develop an effective honeypot that doesn't greatly 
diminish the performance of the devices in a BAN. Meanwhile it still must monitor effectively 
enough to detect attacks on the BAN. Just running the BAN protocol has already affected mote 
battery life [1]. The high level design goals of the Honeypot were as follows: 
 Obvious enough to be an attack target, but not obviously a honeypot.  
 Effectively detects attacks 
 Shouldn’t be a large burden on the power requirements of the embedded sensors. 
 To be specific to a Bluetooth BAN 
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4 Motivations 
Mobile honeypots are a new field and BAN honeypots don't yet exist. Wearable 
embedded devices do not have much security [17]. They can include modern pacemakers or 
glucose meters. Thus one of the chief motivations of this project is to make these devices safe to 
use [14]. Wearable embedded devices also have strict battery requirements meaning that any 
security measures would have to be lightweight. In a passive state a honeypot doesn’t necessarily 
require a lot of computational overhead. To make these devices safe in a practical way, the 
flexibility of a honeypot is desirable; standard cryptographic routines are not desirable because 
they are computationally expensive. Finally, there is a need to secure vital wearable embedded 
devices to be safe to use and this will take more than just implementing standard security. 
 
5 Related Works 
Examples of enterprise Honeypots are Google Honeypot, Honeyd, Homemade honeypot, 
ManTrap and BackOfficer Friendly [13]. In the new field of mobile honeypots there are 
HoneyDroid, HoneyDroid Extension, Mobile Honeynet, and Mobile Communication Honeypot 
to name a few. The following info graphic in Figure 7 visualizes a taxonomy and classification 
of well-known honeypots and the mobile honeypots discussed in Figure 2. Some of the mobile 
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honeypots are in the early stages of design and therefore couldn’t thoroughly be classified. 
  
Figure 2: Classification of Honeypots 
For out purposes, enterprise honeypots aren’t very relevant, so the following examination of 
honeypots will focus on existing mobile honeypots. 
5.1 HoneyDroid 
One example of a mobile honeypot is the HoneyDroid [5]. This honeypot system deals 
with 4 challenges: monitoring, audit logging, containment and visibility. The monitoring issue 
involved how to monitor everything occurring in the system without causing the OS to be easily 
compromised [5]. The goal in monitoring is to have a system that can monitor everything such 
that they can recreate the exact event. The audit logging issue is about creating a secure, reliable 
storage compartment of all the logs. In containment, the honeypot has to be designed such that 
the attacker is able to easily stumble into it but becomes trapped in the honeypot and isn’t able to 
make any further attacks [5]. The issue with visibility is that the honeypot needs to be exposed 
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enough so that the attacker can attack it, but not so visible that it's obvious and easy to get around 
[5]. The design of the HoneyDroid is shown below in Figure 3: 
              
Figure 3: Design of HoneyDroid 
In this diagram the Event Monitor is placed in between the Android OS and Android’s 
own form of Event Monitor that monitors calls and signals. In HoneyDroid the Android OS is 
not able to have direct access to the hardware. Instead, HoneyDroid virtualizes everything thus 
allowing everything to be monitored. This also allows them to take snapshots of the system. In 
this system, the Android OS has no access to the snapshots either; the virtual modem is used to 
fight against malware, leading to the containment functionality [5]. 
The log component receives information from different areas of the system. These logs 
ensure integrity through time stamps. [5]. For visibility, this honeypot is given a public IP 
address. It is planned for HoneyDroid to have automatic installation and execution privileges, 
and give the honeypot access to the internet and allow the honeypot to spread the google account 
name associated with the honeypot. [5]. 
 HoneyDroid seems to be a great system to reference the wearable honeypot. Monitoring, 
audit logging, containment and visibility are key components needed for the wearable honeypot 
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specific system. Specifications of where certain components are stationed may alter however the 
idea of time stamping all components that enter and leave the honeypot, the ability to snapshot 
system activities and  the honeypot given a public IP all seems promising for the wearable 
honeypot system. However, while this honeypot contains many useful properties, it simply 
doesn't provide security to Bluetooth and only applies to the mobile phone, not to a BAN. Also, 
the thorough packet sniffing and analysis of everything coming in and out of the system is 
computationally intensive. 
5.2 HoneyDroid Extension 
Extending from the HoneyDroid, lack of behavioral considerations and existing security 
policy on the mobile device platform became additional challenges. The lack of behavioral 
considerations means mobile users desire to give up security in return for free access to 
applications. This means it’s hard to take into account user actions such as rooting their phones 
or installing malicious applications. The second challenge involved how certain Android 
functions limited the honeypot functionality. These Android functions include things that are 
able to bypass the Android security such as SMS and MMS [4].  Figure 4 bellow illustrates the 
framework for this mobile honeypot. 
 
Figure 4: HoneyDroid Extension 
In this scenario, this mobile honeypot is intended for threats coming from data networks 
that are connected telecommunication cells [4]. The connection for the smart mobile honeypots 
comes through from telecommunication stations, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.  The smart mobile 
honeypots have 2 states: state 1 records data and connects to web server to send this data; state 2 
involves threat monitoring, audit logging, containment and modeling functionalities.  
State 1 has a honeypot that communicates with other honeypots.  Specifically when data 
is being sent from the device, it goes through a honeypot which communicates with other servers 
with honeypots. Then when data is being sent back the honeypot records everything coming in 
[4].  State 2 is a software implementation of threat monitoring, audit logging, containment and 
user’s behavioral logging requirements. Thread monitoring is responsible for monitoring data 
packets going in and out of the system. When a threat is detected, it will gather data focused 
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around that attack. The audit logging will be a copy of the gathered data and will be backed up 
on another server.  For containment, the honeypot will isolate the attack and not let it continue on 
through the network. If there was an occurrence of a fast speeding threat, the mobile device will 
be cut off from the network.  Another module called User Behavioral Module will be monitoring 
and tracking the user’s patterns [4].  
The additions to the HoneyDroid seem plausible. However, for the BAN honeypot it is 
assumed the user is not interested in lowering its security and rooting their Android device.  
Communicating with other honeypot devices for stronger security is also not in the scope of this 
project. Like with the original HoneyDroid the thorough packet analysis is computationally 
intensive. This idea may be used for future works but is not useful for the design of the BAN 
honeypot. 
5.3 Mobile Honeynet 
The implementation of Mobile Honeynet was based on 3 main questions:  
1) Is it necessary that the probe runs on a mobile device 
2) Is it necessary that the honeypot runs on a mobile OS 
3) To which network is the mobile honeypot connected 
This system made the assumption that there is no need to have a mobile honeypot on a 
smartphone [7]. Instead a Linux operating system was used for 2 reasons. One, most 
smartphones use Android OS and, two, it allows you to reuse existing honeypot tools [7]. To 
answer the third question, the mobile probe should connect to a real mobile network. If not, there 
is a chance the attacker can detect differences.  
The implementation of this mobile honeypot consisted of three other honeypots: Kippo, 
Glastopf and Dionaea. Kippo is an SSH honeypot that has a trivial password. This allows the 
attacker to gain access into the system. The attacker is given administrator privileges where the 
attacker can execute common programs, download and install anything else they wanted. In the 
background the honeypot records everything and uses it later for analysis. To prevent more 
problems for the honeypot, executing newly installed programmers are prohibited. 
The second honeypot, Glastopf provides uploads to web-based servers. This honeypot 
monitors and watches this upload and logs everything that comes in and out of this uploaded file. 
And finally, Dionaea is a honeypot that monitors all transport ports. 
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For the BAN honeypot, this honeynet system cannot be referenced. This honeynet system 
regards the fact a mobile honeypot is needed and attempts to utilize other manufactured 
honeypots. The manufactured honeypots don’t apply to the BAN. 
5.4 Mobile Communication Honeypot 
The final system had an interesting way of implementing their mobile honeypot.  The 
design is shown below in Figure 5 [6]. 
                  
 
Figure 5: Mobile Communication Honeypot 
As this figure shows the honeypot is broken down into four layers: access, networking 
simulating wireless environment, data transmission, data analysis and system supervisor. Within 
these layers mobile communication terminals, wireless link access module, data transmission 
module and application processing center module [6]. 
 This communication honeypot cannot be referenced when designing the BAN honeypot. 
Even though this system is plausible, the BAN communicates through Bluetooth and does not 
require the Internet. Additionally communicating through the internet is another security 
vulnerability to be aware of. 
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6 System Model 
6.1 BAN 
The system the honeypot is built on is a plug and play BAN protocol. The BAN consists 
of a basestation (BS) and sensor nodes or motes.  The topology of the BAN is shown below in 
figure 6: 
 
Figure 6: BAN Topology 
The BAN was designed as a link layer protocol with these properties: 
 Does not inherently rely on static message identifiers,  
 Supports new sensors, motes, and commands without changes to the mote 
firmware or basestation application  
 Have a flexible basestation learning language that can be expanded easily through 
changes to a few Grammars and  
 Have a BAN platform that is flexible enough to support any type of research or 
real world application.[1] 
In creating this BAN protocol, a platform was needed. For a mobile device, the team 
decided on the Android platform due to its wide usage across many different devices. For a 
sensing platform, they decided on the Shimmer platform. Shimmer is designed specifically for 
wearable applications and is used widely in medical fields. Much of Shimmer’s resources are 
open source, making it useful to the goal of that protocol. 
Shimmer’s sensors are separated into three groups including kinematic sensors, 
biophysical sensors, and ambient sensors. Kinematic sensors record movement (i.e. velocity and 
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position), biomedical sensors record medical data (i.e. heart rate and body temperature), and 
ambient sensors measure environmental properties (i.e. temperature and humidity). Shimmer 
comes with the following sensor options: ECG, EMG, GSR, 9DoF, GPS, Strain Gauge, and 
Accelerometer. Shimmer also includes Lab View, Matlab, Android, and Windows applications 
as basestation platforms [12]. For the OS platform, Shimmer’s motes are TinyOS based. The 
implementers of the BAN used TinyOS because it's a well used library that's been around for a 
long time and has a large support community [1].  
The protocol itself is very good for generic use. The mote has six states: Idle, 
Discoverable, Paired, Connected, Command & Inquiry and Streaming. The Basestation, on the 
other hand has a total of seven states: Idle, Discovery, Paired, Connected, Command & Inquiry, 
Mote Data and Mote Response. As a general summary, the BAN is designed using a state 
machine design pattern. Each state has one action. Some states allow a user to send commands, 
request sensor data, receive sensor data, etc. Doing a different task means transitioning to a 
different state. The protocol specifically forbids doing or requesting an action for a state other 
than the one the mote is currently in [1]. The way this is implemented is through a set of 
functions that allows the basestation to ask each mote that connects how to use it. This allows the 
motes to teach the basestation all of its functionality. Thus, the basestation has no prior 
knowledge of what any of the motes can do. There are only 7 different kinds of messages in the 
BAN protocol, they are detailed in Figure 7: 
               
Figure 7: Types of Messages in BAN Protocol 
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 This means that the BAN is completely extendable to include different motes without 
updating the basestation. The unused message types allow the protocol itself to be extended as 
well. Figure 8 illustrates the communication architecture of the BAN. 
Mote
Normal BAN Communication
Master
Slave
M
o
te
Slave
M
o
te
Slave
 
Figure 8: BAN Communication Overview 
6.2 Threat Model 
In addition to the protocol there are a few more assumptions. One assumption is that the 
basestation user is not the attacker as a BSN can contain important medical devices. The 
basestation can only pair with motes when the user initiates pairing. It is assumed that the user 
will not knowingly pair with any attacker. In addition to the system here, there are assumptions 
made about an attacker. 
There is an assumption that the attacker would have relatively high computational 
abilities – in addition to the computational power of today's high end laptops it is relatively 
cheap and simple to rent out compute time on servers from companies like Amazon. Specifically 
Amazon Web Services has the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), which gives 750 
computing hours on Linux and 750 hours on Windows server free then charges $0.105 (2 Cores 
and 3.75 GiB RAM) to $1.68 an hour (32 cores and 60 GiB RAM) for compute time on compute 
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optimized servers [28].  The attacker can also spoof, launch man in the middle attacks, and has 
the knowledge to decrypt encryption. Decrypting encryption is where the attacker would most 
benefit from EC2 as EC2 is made for relatively short (hours, days, or months) and intense 
workloads. With the short range of Bluetooth, only one adversary was assumed; however one 
person can use multiple devices simulating multiple adversaries. This project did not use 
Amazon EC2 to simulate the attacker. It is used here as an example of where an attacker can rent 
out heavy duty compute space to crack encryption. 
7 Wearable Honeypot 
The Wearable Honeypot system is meant to detect threats to a BSN. The basis for the 
honeypot is a message system to attract attackers to the honeypot. The message system involves 
a message exchange between the BS and specialized helper motes. The BS and the motes 
communicate in a pre-arranged way. This message exchange acts as bait for an attacker to pay 
attention to the helper motes because it is the most active part of the BAN. Initially just like with 
other motes, the basestation will ask for all information about the motes (sensors, types of data, 
commands, etc.)  and then initialize the honeypot message system. In this mode the BS 
periodically sets and resets what the motes are sending to it. The data the mote sends back is 
coordinated and known to the basestation. An attacker spoofing messages would cause the 
expectations of this system to be violated. Using this approach many attacks can be detected. The 
architecture of the honeypot is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: Wearable Honeypot Architecture  
 Because a honeypot is meant to detect threats, as a first step in designing the honeypot 
system, a threat model was developed. The threat model was an outline of all possible adversary 
attacks the honeypot will be on the lookout for. By examining the Bluetooth protocol and BAN 
protocol, attacks were devised. This eventually became a honeypot model when corresponding 
detection information was added. However, before that is presented, it is important to understand 
message system because the honeypot model depends on it. 
7.1 Attacker Attraction Message System 
As mentioned above, the detection mechanisms depend on a message coordination 
scheme. There are two logical communication channels between the helper motes and the 
basestation, a high security channel and a low security channel. The high security channel is 
where the message system is coordinated by the basestation and the low security channel is for 
“normal” BAN PnP communication. The high security channel is secured with the AES block 
cipher in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode. This message coordination scheme relies on 
simultaneously synthesizing accelerometer data on the motes and BS, which involves a PRNG 
(Pseudo-random Number Generator). Over the high security channel, the basestation sends a 
coordination message which tells the motes which kind of accelerometer data (sitting or walking) 
to synthesize and how many data points to send back to the basestation as supposed sensor data 
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for accelerometers. This way, the basestation can know what messages to expect from motes and 
when (these stream in and the average rate is monitored for sudden changes). Additionally, once 
a mote receives a coordination message, it should only ever expect more of them and nothing 
else. If a mote receives any other message it will send an encrypted message to the basestation 
indicating that an attacker was detected. If the basestation receives any packets from helper 
motes before they request data stream to be started, then this also allows attackers to be detected. 
Table 1 presents packet description of the coordination message and an example mote return 
packets. The basestation coordination message packet is broken down into two parts: Header and 
Body. The header specifies the packet size, sequence number and Message ID (1111 1110b). The 
body specifies the type and the number of accelerometer values to send as well as initializes the 
PRNG.  The mote packet response also contains a header and body where the header specifies 
packet size, sequence number and message ID while the body specifies Sensor ID and message 
value. 
Table 1: Honeypot Message System Specification 
Honeypot Message System Specification 
BS Coordination Message Example Mote "DATA" Response Packets 
// Header: 
0000 0000 
0001 1000 : packet size 24 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 : sequence number 
1111 1110 : message ID  
// Body  
// 10 messages -- array of 10 16 bit values 
0000 0001 : // Type of data, 1 for walking, 0 for sitting  
0000 0010  
1101 0000 : // Number of data points to send 
// 4 32 bit integers to initialize PRNG 
0000 0011  
0100 0111 
0101 0000  
0101 0011 : 1 
0000 0000   
0110 0011 
0111 0111  
0010 1010 : 2 
0011 1001  
0110 0000 
0000 0011  
0110 0100 : 3 
1010 0101 
0111 0111 
0111 1000  
0000 0100 : 4 
// First mote response 
// Header: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : packet size 8 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : sequence number 
0000 0000 : message ID  - mote data 
// Body: 
0000 0001 : Sensor ID 
0110 0011  
0100 0010 : Sensor data payload (message value) 
//  Second mote response 
// Header: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : packet size 8 
0000 0000 
0000 1001 : sequence number 
0000 0000 : message ID  - mote data 
// Body: 
0000 0001 : Sensor ID 
0110 0000 
0000 0011: Sensor data payload (message value) 
 
// Third mote response 
// Header: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : packet size 8 
0000 0000 
0000 1010 : sequence number 
0000 0000 : message ID  - mote data 
// Body: 
0000 0001 : Sensor ID 
0100 0111 
0101 0000: Sensor data payload (message value) 
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In a situation where an attacker is detected, the message ID would alter to 1111 1101b and 
transmit this sequence over the secure channel. With this communication mechanism, the 
basestation will know when it wasn't a honeypot mote that sent the message. 
7.1.1 Synthesizing Accelerometer Data 
For the message system, we needed to determine a method to send false yet realistic data 
to attract the attacker’s attention yet not make it obviously fake. The idea we set upon was to 
synthesize real sensor data. We settled on accelerometer data as the best option for this endeavor. 
There are many devices with accelerometers and it isn’t abnormal for someone to have more 
than one sensor monitoring accelerometer data. After that, exactly how we synthesize it became 
the next issue. Mathematically synthesizing the data is very computationally intensive, so we 
decided to start with a real data bank of accelerometer values for different activities. 
7.1.1.1 Real Accelerometer Data 
 We found data collected and published for the purpose of activity recognition from 
accelerometer data[29]. The activities were separated, graphed, and the standard deviations were 
calculated in order to understand the data. The Wearable Honeypot is kept simple and uses two 
main activities and two more as transitions between them. Walking and sitting are the main 
activities. When transitioning from sitting to walking, one must first stand up from sitting, which 
we have data for; when going from walking to sitting, one must sit down first. These provide a 
couple seconds of realistic transition. There were more activities available (such as lying down, 
on all fours and falling), however these activities that don’t generally happen in public.  The 
graph in Figure 10 present the data points for walking.  
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Figure 10: Original Walking Accelerometer Data 
 Figure 10 shows a fairly consistent data set of walking accelerometer values. Towards the 
end it appears that the user may have been transitioning to another activity because it doesn’t 
match the general pattern in the rest of the data. While calculating the standard deviation these 
values were ignored. 
 
Figure 11: Original Standing Up From Sitting Accelerometer Data 
 Figure 11 shows accelerometer values for standing up from sitting. The data in this 
section is fairly regular between points, however a little past halfway through there is a major 
shift downward for the X and Y. From that point on it is fairly regular again. To accommodate 
for this, the graph was divided in two and two different standard deviations were calculated. 
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Figure 12: Original Sitting Accelerometer Data 
Figure 12 shows the accelerometer data from sitting. As would be expected it is very regular. 
 
Figure 13: Original Sitting Down Accelerometer Data 
Figure 13 shows the sitting down data. Due to the Y vector presenting a similar problem to 
standing up from sitting down, all vectors were divided in two and two separate calculations 
were made for both range and standard deviation. The smallest range and standard deviation 
values for each vector were used for future calculations. Table 2 presents each activity’s vector 
and their standard deviations. 
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Table 2: Standard Deviation 
Activity Vector Standard Deviation 
Walking X 0.272615 
Y 0.151893 
Z 0.407375 
Standing Up From Sitting X 0.149059089 
Y 0.109661235 
Z 0.407219629 
Sitting X 0.185340687 
Y 0.326012929 
Z 0.450997835 
Sitting Down X 0.221174625 
Y 0.363783609 
Z 0.443966194 
As one may notice, if we simply replay this data over and over, it would become obvious 
that it is fake. There are some areas where data points are exaggerated. These would be most 
obvious. However we interpreted those data values as noise when the test subject transitioned 
from one activity to another. Using this assumption those values were ignored for the calculation 
of the standard deviation for each dataset. However, even without the spikes, transmitting the 
same values every 100 or so points will be obviously fake anyway. Therefore we need to modify 
this data. 
7.1.1.2 Pseudo-random Number Generator Selection 
 Initializing the PRNG requires determining a method to randomize the accelerometer 
data. Several PRNG’s were researched; three in particular: RC4, Mersenne Twister and TinyMT. 
Since the quality of randomness wasn’t as important as minimized computational load and 
maximizing battery efficiency, first an analysis of the number of operations (assignment, 
arithmetic operations, bitwise operations such as & and bit shift) required to generate random 
numbers as shown in Table 3: 
Table 3: PRNG Operation Comparison Table 
Attribute RC4 [31] Mersenne Twister 
[32] 
TinyMT [30] 
State Memory Size 256 Byte + 40 Byte 
key 
2496 Bytes 16 bytes 
    
Operations until 1st 
number 
206 + 2844 = 3050 4364 + 8112 + 20 + 1  
= 12478 
101 + 41 = 142 
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Operations Until 2nd 
Number 
3050 + 2844 = 5894 12478 + 20 = 12498 142 + 41 = 183 
    
Operations until Nth 
number 
206 + 2844N 
+⌊(N/40)⌋*204 
4364 + 8112 + 20N + 
1 + ⌊(N/624)⌋*8112 
 
101 + 41N 
 
As you can see, the TinyMT PRNG is a clear choice given those criterion. Additionally it 
is also of high quality. It has a period of 2127, and the floating point numbers are based upon 
evenly distributed 32 bit integers[30]. Pseudo-code or implementations for each is included in 
the appendix. Using TinyMT, we can add small random offsets to the original Data. 
7.1.1.3 Modified Accelerometer Data 
Utilizing the TinyMT PRNG as well as the calculated standard deviations of each 
activity’s vector, multiple randomized number is tempered to within +- one standard deviation. 
TinyMT can return a floating point r such that 0 <= r < 1. Equation 1 can be used to temper r to 
the desired range.  
𝑟` =  (𝑟 − 0.5) ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑑 ∗ 2 
Equation 1 
Where std is the standard deviation and r` is the tempered result. 
These tempered offsets were then added to the original dataset creating a randomized, 
realistically synthesized set of data. The random offsets were needed so the same data wouldn’t 
be streamed over and over, and the spikes (noise) needed to be removed because a spike every 
constant number of data points is also suspicious. The graph presented in Figure 14 shows the 
original walking vector (as in the magnitude of the x, y, and z), the noise cancelled vector using 
the criteria described above, and the resultant randomized vector. 
27 
 
 
Figure 14- Modified Walking Accelerometer Data 
 The resultant offset vector has more or less the same pattern as the original data, however 
is clearly different than the original data. Meaning that this is plausibly walking data, and it never 
repeats. Figure 15 shows the same vectors as Figure 14 for standing up from sitting. 
 
Figure 15: Modified Standing Up Form Sitting Accelerometer Data 
Like before the resultant offset vector is clearly the same type of accelerometer data, however the 
data values aren’t the same and don’t repeat. Figure 16 shows the same vectors as Figure 14 for 
standing up from sitting. 
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Figure 16: Modified Sitting Accelerometer Data 
The sitting vector is very close, as the regular pattern from the original graph would suggest. 
This zoomed in graph very tightly follows the original line (in most places, what looks like a 
spike resulted from 3 offsets for X, Y and Z that were very closed to +standard deviation). This 
very plausibly provides sitting data that doesn’t repeat. Figure 17 shows the same vectors as 
Figure 14 for standing up from sitting. 
 
Figure 17: Modified Sitting Down Accelerometer Data 
 With this graph we can conclude the offset vector does not repeat and stays consistent 
and in range within the actual activity for all activities. 
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7.1.2 Message Window 
 Going message by message and monitoring message by message delays doesn’t result in 
a very robust detection mechanism and would be prone to many false positives and false 
negatives. This is because if one packet is dropped, that is a sign there may be an attacker. There 
are also many attacks that would be missed. Instead of worrying about each message individually 
a message window is considered. 
 For the message window there is a balance of keeping track of more messages and 
therefore having more information in which to build detection mechanisms from and having 
fewer messages in the window allowing for faster detection. The mote tries to send the 
accelerometer data value every 250ms.  
In a message window, we also have to consider the possibility of packets being lost due 
to some temporary interference. With a message window of size n, k number of packets need to 
be dropped before the basestation determines this to be an attacker. If we have a small window 
size n and a small k, the speed at which an attacker can be detected increases. For instance, to 
allow 4 packets to be dropped a window of 8 messages minimum would be needed, to be safe 
use a 10 message window. 
 Using this 10 message window, if 4 packets were dropped, the system would know what 
that 5th packet is supposed to be when it comes in. For the purposes of the Wearable Honeypot 4 
packets in a row are acceptable, but the 5th one would mean there is an attacker. Figure 18 
demonstrates this idea. 
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Figure 18 - Five Packets Dropped in A Row 
This message window also protects from replay attacks, as the expected value is known, so an 
attacker cannot resend an old one. Within the message window the average delay is kept track of. 
If, within a window, the average delay get too far from 250ms, then an attacker would be 
detected. If packets are dropped, the expected delays for the missing packets are taken out from 
that delay. The attacker has a small chance spoofing an expected value in the window (1/4096 – 
the incoming value is a 12-bit ADC reading from an accelerometer). If, by chance, the attacker 
manages the expected packet, then there is no way of detecting this. But, if the attacker sends an 
unexpected packet, then an attacker would be detected. Figure 19 demonstrates this idea. 
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Figure 19 - Attacker Window Insertion 
In this situation, while the real packet may have been dropped (so the spoofed packet wouldn’t 
be caught on the basis of delays) the spoofed packet would then be compared with the expected 
message and the attacker would be detected. 
7.2 Honeypot Detection Mechanisms 
The Honeypot started threat model; to determine the detection mechanisms required, first 
the attacks to detect had to be known. First, the Bluetooth protocol itself was examined. This 
yielded many attacks (mostly disconnection attacks) without any consideration of the BAN 
protocol. Then when it came to the BAN protocol itself, there were two main attack scenarios – 
spoofing the basestation and spoofing a mote already in the BAN. Given the master slave nature 
of Bluetooth one cannot spoof a new mote and try to add it to the BAN, so attacks of this 
principle were not considered. 
32 
 
7.2.1 Bluetooth & Disconnection Attacks 
The Bluetooth protocol yields many attacks involving disconnecting the basestation from 
the motes. Doing this would limit the amount of communication and leave the motes vulnerable 
and able to be completely hijacked, i.e. disconnected from basestation. Then the attacker then has 
the ability to pair with the mote and become its new master. The illustration in Figure 20 presents 
a visual explanation of this type of attack. 
 
Figure 20: Disconnection Attack 
Table 4 details the different types of disconnection attacks with a detailed description of 
how these attacks would look like. The chart also presents the methods of detecting these attacks. 
Table 4: Bluetooth and Disconnection Attacks 
Bluetooth and Disconnection Attacks (Type C) 
Description of Attack Vectors Application 
Packet/Modifications to BT 
Frame 
Detection Mechanism 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Mote/Spoofed 
Basestation 
Motes/Basestati
on 
1. Bluetooth eavesdropping. 
Especially moment of pairing 
will compromise all Bluetooth 
level security. 
 
Best done with a Bluetooth 
sniffing device like 
Ubertooth[24]. However, 
BT addresses are not 
actually globally unique 
which means you can iterate 
through the common 
address and find a non-
discoverable device [22]. 
There is generally no way to 
detect eavesdropping. 
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Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Mote/Basesta
tion/Other 
Connected 
Bluetooth devices 
in BAN 
2. An attack that jams all the 
Bluetooth channels will cause 
Bluetooth devices to think 
they're disconnected and re-
initiate the pairing process. [22] 
This is done by sending 
signals on all available 
Bluetooth frequencies. 
When devices re-initiate 
pairing, an attacker can pose 
as both the basestation and 
motes and have legitimate 
parties connect to the 
attacker spoofs [22]. Thus 
giving a true MIMA. 
Whenever a Bluetooth 
device disconnects from a 
basestation, its address and 
the time it disconnected is 
stored in a shared data 
structure. If there are only 2 
motes and they disconnect 
within 1 sec or else if all the 
motes disconnected within 2 
seconds, an attack is 
detected. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Basestation 
Motes in BAN 
3. An attack that sends pairing 
request packets over and over 
without follow up. 
 After entering a PIN, a 
number is generated and 
sent to the slave device to 
initiate the pairing process. 
Instantiate packet and send. 
With the default Bluetooth 
library on Android you can't 
access the part of the 
Bluetooth stack to detect 
this. 
 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Motes BaseStation 
4. Buffer overrun on the 
Bluetooth frame. This can 
overrun the Bluetooth receive 
buffer causing the app to crash. 
Using Ubertooth inject a 
packet that gives the wrong 
size in a Bluetooth frame 
[24]. 
With the default Bluetooth 
library on Android you can't 
access the part of the 
Bluetooth stack to detect 
this. The default library was 
once vulnerable to this kind 
of attack but a bug fix was 
merged into the  
Git repository in 2013. [25] 
 
7.2.3 Targeting BS by Spoofing Motes 
 The second kind of adversary could be an attacker that is pretending to be a mote already 
in the BAN. One reason an attacker may want to do this is to confuse the basestation and send 
false information around. This may cause behavior in the BAN that would be detrimental to the 
user. The illustration in Figure 21 presents a visual representation of this kind of attack.  
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Figure 21: Spoofed Mote Attacks 
 Table 5 outlines different attacks based on spoofing motes and their detection 
mechanisms. 
Table 5: Spoofing Motes Already In Ban 
Spoofing Motes Already in BAN (Type B) 
Description of Attack Vectors Application 
Packet/Modifications to BT 
Frame 
Detection Mechanism 
Attacker  Target 
Spoofed Mote Basestation 
1. Buffer overrun attack on the 
application packet. This means 
the  Bluetooth layer would be 
unaffected, but when the 
application packet gets handed 
up it will be bigger than the 
application expected and this 
can overrun the buffer 
allowing malicious code to be 
inserted in adjacent memory to 
that used by the app. 
Header: 
0000 0000 
0001 0110 ; packet size 22 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0101 ; message ID 
Body 
0000 0001 ; sensor ID 
Value mappings: 
0000 0011 : Size 
0000 0010 : type ID 2's comp integer 
0000 0000 
0000 0011 ; size of value name 
0100 0111 ; G 
0101 0000 ; P 
0101 0011 ; s 
0000 0000  
0000 0011 ; SIZE OF equation 
0111 0111 ; x 
0010 1010 ; * 
0011 1001 ; 9 
0000 0000 
0000 0011 ; size of value units 
The size of the messages are 
known therefore any spoofed 
message that is oversized would 
be easily detectable. 
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0110 0100 ; d 
0110 0101 ; e 
0110 0111 ; g 
0000 0000 ;  null pointer beyond buffer, 
byte 23 
0000 0000 
0000 0000 
0000 0000  
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Motes Basestation 
2. Spoof Data Inquiry response 
packets, i.e. try giving data 
conversion equations that 
divide by 0. 
Header: 
0000 0000 
0001 0110 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0101 ; message ID 
Body: 
0000 0001 ; sensor ID 
Value mappings: 
0000 0011 : Size 
0000 0010 : type ID 2's comp integer 
0000 0000 
0000 0011 ; size of value name 
0100 0111 ; G 
0101 0000 ; P 
0101 0011 ; S 
0000 0000  
0000 0011 ; SIZE OF conversion equation 
0111 0111 ; x 
0010 1111 ; / 
0011 0000 ; 0 – conversion equation 
0000 0000 
0000 0011 ; size of value units 
0110 0100 ; d 
0110 0101 ; e 
0110 0111 ; g 
Cleanse input and conversion 
equations. As part of cleansing 
the conversion equations make 
sure to check divide by 0 and 
anything besides a 
mathematical expression. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Motes Basestation 
3. Too many packets can make 
it so a basestation is too busy 
processing incoming packets 
to control mote. DOS attacks 
such as this are known to drain 
battery life significantly. [22] 
It doesn't really matter what 
is in the packets themselves. 
It may be a good idea to 
spoof source address in the 
Bluetooth frame, but that's 
not necessary for the attack. 
Two packets received in less 
than the expected delay is 
obviously an attacker because 
coordinated messages only 
come every previously 
coordinated number of 
milliseconds. 
 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Motes Basestation 
4. Attacker transmits a 
message of type Mote Data 
sending data that is not 
plausible. This may cause bad 
information to be recorded by 
the Basestation. 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
0000 0001; sensor ID 
1111 1111 ; 
1111 1111; sensor data payload 
With the content of the 
messages known, any such 
message coming in with a 
different value would be from 
an attacker.  
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Motes Basestation 
5. Attacker transmits a 
message of type Mote Data 
sending data that is plausibly 
correct. This will cause 
plausibly incorrect information 
to be recorded by the BAN 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
0000 0001; sensor ID 
0000 0000 
1010 1111; sensor data payload 
With the content of the 
messages known, any such 
message coming in with a 
different value would be from 
an attacker. 
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which can have differing 
consequences depending on 
the device. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Mote Basestation 
6. Spoof packets with 
incrementing sequence 
numbers in header so 
basestation and mote’s 
sequence numbers become out 
of sync 
Packet 1: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
0000 0001; sensor ID 
0000 0000 
1010 1111; sensor data payload 
Packet 2: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
0000 0001 ; sensor ID 
0000 0001 
1010 1110; sensor data payload 
Packet 3: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 1001 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
0000 0001 ; sensor ID 
0000 0001 
1010 1111 ; sensor data payload 
In the basestation 
implementation they throw out 
the sequence number. 
Documentation says otherwise.  
Therefore this needs to be 
detected (by keeping track of 
incoming sequence numbers). 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Mote Basestation 
7. Spoof a mote response to a 
Sensor Inquiry. Giving false 
information about available 
sensors will cause the BAN to 
malfunction. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0001 ; message ID 
Body: 
0000 0001: number of Sensors 
Sensory mappings: 
0000 0001 : sensor ID 
0000 0011 : 
0000 0010 : size of sensor name 
0000 0000 
0000 0100 : size of value name 
0100 0111 : G 
0101 1001 : Y 
0101 0010 : R 
0100 1111 : O - sensory name 
 
The basestation will know what 
the helper mote's response is 
supposed to be. If it differs an 
attack is detected. 
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Attacker Target 
Spoofed Mote Basestation 
8. Spoof a Command Inquiry 
response packet. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0010 ; message ID 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general 
request 
0000 0001 : number of commands 
//Command mappings 
0000 0001 : command ID 
0000 0000 : 
0000 0100 : size of command name 
0101 0011 : S 
0101 1001 : Y 
0100 1110 : N 
0100 0011 : C – command name 
The basestation will know what 
the helper mote's response is 
supposed to be. If it differs an 
attack is detected. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Mote Basestation 
9. Spoof a Command Returns 
Inquiry response packet. 
Divide by 0 attacks or other 
false info. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 : sequence number 
0000 0100 : message ID 
Body 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general 
request 
0000 0001 : command ID to ask about 
Value mappings: 
0000 0011 : Size 
0000 0010 : type ID 2's comp integer 
0000 0000 
0000 1011 : size of return name 
0111 0011 : s 
0110 0101 : e 
0110 1110 : n 
0111 0011 : s 
0110 1001 : i 
0111 0100 : t 
0110 1001 : i 
0111 0110 : v 
0110 1001 : i 
0111 0100 : t 
0111 1001: y 
0000 0000  
0000 0011 ; SIZE OF return conversion 
equation 
0111 0111 ; x 
0010 1111 ; / 
0011 0000 ; 0 – conversion equation 
0000 0000 
0000 0000 : size of value units  
The basestation will know what 
the helper mote's response is 
supposed to be. If it differs an 
attack is detected. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Mote Basestation 
10. Spoof a Command Params 
Inquiry response packet. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0011 ; message ID 
Body 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general 
request 
0000 0001 : command ID to ask about 
0000 0001 : number of parameters 
Param mappings 
0000 0010 : Parameter size 
0000 0010 : Type ID 2's comp 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 : Size of param name 
The basestation will know what 
the helper mote's response is 
supposed to be. If it differs an 
attack is detected. 
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0111 0011 : s 
0110 0101 : e 
0111 0100 : t 
0111 0100 : t 
0110 1001 : i 
0110 1110 : n 
0110 0111 : g – param name 
0000 0000 
0000 0101 : size of restriction set 
0011 0000 : 0 
0010 0000 : (space) 
0010 1101 : - 
0010 0000 : (space) 
0011 0101 : 5 
0000 0000 : size of parameter units 
 
 
7.2.4 Spoofing Basestation to Target Motes 
A third type of adversary is if the attacker was a spoofed basestation. The basestation, 
being the master in this BAN, has a lot of power and capabilities. Figure 22 presents a better 
understanding of this type of attack.  
 
Figure 22: Spoofed Basestation Attacks 
 
Table 6 shows different attacks that can be accomplished by spoofing the basestation. 
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Table 6: Spoofed Basestation Attacks 
Spoof Basestation (Type A) 
Description of Attack 
Vectors 
Application 
Packet/Modifications to BT 
Frame 
Detection Mechanism 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Basestation 
Mote 
1. Learning mote commands 
and then spoofing basestation 
packets to motes for them to 
execute commands. 
0000 0000 
0000 0101 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
1111 1111 ; message ID 
 
The helper motes should never 
receive a command.  
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Basestation 
Mote 
2. Sending too many packets 
can make it so a mote is too 
busy processing incoming 
packets to deal with 
legitimate communications 
with basestation. DOS 
attacks such as this are 
known to drain battery life 
significantly. [22] 
It doesn't really matter what is 
in the packets themselves. It 
may be a good idea to spoof 
source address in the 
Bluetooth frame, but that's not 
necessary for the attack. 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive coordination 
messages for the message 
system. These messages will be 
encrypted so they will be easily 
distinguishable from spoofed 
packets. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Basestation 
Motes 
3. Spoof packets with 
incrementing sequence 
numbers in header so 
basestation and mote’s 
sequence numbers become 
out of sync. 
Packet 1: 
0000 0000 
0000 0101 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
Packet 2: 
0000 0000 
0000 0101 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
Packet 3: 
0000 0000 
0000 0101 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 1001 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
In the current implementation 
the motes ignore this field. 
Documentation suggested this 
field was important and used. 
Therefore this needs to be 
detected (by keeping track of 
incoming sequence numbers). 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Basestation 
Motes 
4. Spoof a Sensor Inquiry. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0001 ; message ID 
 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive message 
system coordination messages. 
As this is not a message system 
message, the attacker would be 
detected. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Basestation 
Motes 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive message 
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5. Spoof a Command 
Inquiry. 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0010 ; message ID 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general request 
 
system coordination messages. 
As this is not a message system 
message, the attacker would be 
detected. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Basestation 
Motes 
6. Spoof a Command Params 
Inquiry. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0011 ; message ID 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general request 
0000 0001 : command ID to ask about 
 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive message 
system coordination messages. 
As this is not a message system 
message, the attacker would be 
detected. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Basestation 
Motes 
7. Spoof a Data Inquiry. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0101 ; message ID 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general request 
 
 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive message 
system coordination messages. 
As this is not a message system 
message, the attacker would be 
detected. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Basestation 
Motes 
8. Spoof a Command Returns 
Inquiry. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 : sequence number 
0000 0100 : message ID 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general request 
0000 0001 : command ID to ask about 
 
 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive message 
system coordination messages. 
As this is not a message system 
message, the attacker would be 
detected. 
 
 
With this honeypot model, all the information needed to be able to implement the 
honeypot is documented. 
8 Wearable Honeypot Testing and Results 
To make the Wearable Honeypot worthwhile it had to meet some design goals. The first 
of which is to be able to attract an attacker which was shown in the “Attacker Attraction 
Message System” section. Next it has to be specific to the BAN and Bluetooth protocol which 
was shown in the “Honeypot Detection Mechanisms” section. The two other design goals were 
to be more efficient than standard encryption and to be able to effectively detect attackers. 
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8.1 Honeypot Lifetime Tests 
 To test that the honeypot system is more efficient than standard encryption a control was 
needed. AES block cipher is the most secure standard cipher available for TinyOS. This was 
easily used on Android as well. Because simply encoding with the block cipher isn’t very secure, 
the encryption was done in cipher block chaining mode. 
8.1.1 Methodology 
 As part of implementing the message system a high security channel was encrypted with 
AES-128 bit in cipher block chaining mode. For a comparision of the efficiency of the honeypot, 
there was also a battery test of real accelerometer data collected from the ADC which was 
encrypted before sending at BAN’s default rate of 32 Hz. The Honeypot message system was 
then run at the following data rates: 40 Hz, 100 Hz, 70 Hz and finally 50 Hz. The procedure for 
each test was as follows: 
1. Charge Mote 
2. Flash mote with firmware version for the configurations above. 
3. Pair motes with basestation 
4. Run basestation application and add mote to BAN 
5. Basestation records time when connected to BAN 
6. Mote streams data until dead 
7. Basestation records time when mote stops streaming 
8. Basestation calculated time elapsed and outputs to screen 
Each test was on the 2 motes with the largest form factor and then the results of both tests were 
averaged. 
8.1.2 Results 
 The results of the tests as outlined in the previous section are summarized in the 
following graph in figure 23. 
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Figure 23: Battery Testing Results 
The graph clearly shows that the honeypot can be run almost twice as fast as the BAN normally 
is before the honeypot becomes less battery efficient than the motes. One could look a this and 
say that the honeypot only saves a half hour over encryption. However the encryption test was 
run at 32Hz where the honeypot tests were run at much faster data rates. Additonally, the 
encryption would be running on the same motes that are needed as sensors, taking away from 
their operating life. The honeypot runs independently of those devices and doesn’t drain their 
battery. In this way even at nearly double the default data rate the honeypot will provide security 
to the system longer than encryption without impacting the battery performance of the necessary 
sensor motes. 
8.2 Attack Detection 
 The final design goal to be met is to effectively detect attacks. For this the original plan 
was to mount Bluetooth attacks. For this purpose an Ubertooth One Bluetooth testing device was 
procured [24]. The Ubertooth One can channel hop to all Bluetooth channels and the version of 
firmware released in summer 2014 is documented to be able to inject packets [24]. This device 
was set up and packet capture with kismet was initiated. This worked in the sense that many 
many Bluetooth packets were sniffed. However the packets that were sniffed were just other 
43 
 
packets in the vicinity from relatively nearby Bluetooth devices. This sort of promiscuous packet 
capture mode was not able to help with mounting attacks because while it may be able to hop 
around and sniff on every Bluetooth channel, it can’t sniff on all channels in the same instant. 
 The Ubertooth One in addition to interfacing with Kismet has its own firmware 
commands. One command is ubertooth-follow which allows the user to specify the LAP (Lower 
Address Portion) and the UAP (Upper Address Portion). For some context, a diagram of a 
Bluetooth address is shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24: Bluetooth Address Format [22] 
This is supposed to lock on the Bluetooth device with the specified address. The software is then 
supposed to calculate the NAP. One of the Bluetooth addresses in the BAN is (MSB to LSB in 
HEX): 00:06:66:A0:3A:51. When running the command ubertooth-follow –uap 66 –lap 
A0:3A:51 the Ubertooth tries to lock on to 00:00:66:A0:3A:51 which of course doesn’t exist. 
This means it is not calculating the NAP properly. The following command was then attempted 
ubertooth-follow –nap 00:06 –uap 66  –lap A0:3A:51. This command was not accepted (as 
expected as –nap was not in documentation or help menu). Finally this command was attempted: 
ubertooth-follow –uap 06:66 –lap A0:3A:51 and the Ubertooth attempted to lock on to 
00:00:0666:A0:3A:51, which is not a valid Bluetooth address. Because of this it was technically 
infeasible to launch Bluetooth attacks to really detect attackers. 
 However the detection mechanisms were able to be tested another way. When it comes to 
Bluetooth disconnection attack detection, this was simulated by blocking the signals from the 
mote (by wrapping it in tin foil when streaming data) and the basestation realized that the mote 
was being interfered with. Also, if responses to the BAN PnP requests were modified the 
honeypot detected the presence of an attacker. Finally, if the wrong honeypot data message was 
sent the Basestation also detected as an attacker. These results are promising and suggest that the 
system does effectively detect attacks. 
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8 Conclusion 
 The goal of this project was to design and implement a honeypot to add computationally 
lightweight security to a BAN. The security added by the honeypot acts as an alarm system that 
detects attacks. The design goals of the system were: 
1. To be able to attract attackers to attack it 
2. To be specific to the BAN and it’s Bluetooth communication 
3. To be more efficient than standard encryption 
4. To effectively detect attacks 
 The first of the design goals was met with realistic, pre-determined data stream as 
explained “Attacker Attraction Message System” part of the “Wearable Honeypot” section. The 
second design goal was met with a detailed list of all attacks that work on the BAN protocol and 
Bluetooth as shown in the “Honeypot Detection Mechanisms” part of the “Wearable Honeypot” 
section. The honeypot also met its third design goal of being more efficient than standard 
encryption with AES in cipher block chaining mode as shown in the “Honeypot Lifetime Tests” 
part of the testing and results section. The final design goal of effectively detecting attacks 
wasn’t able to be directly tested by mounting a Bluetooth attack, however tests suggest that the 
detection mechanisms do work as explained in the “Attack Detection” part of the testing and 
results section. 
 The honeypot detects attacks in two ways. It can detect when the BAN PnP protocol 
requests are tampered with as well as data stream (sensor data) tampering. It can do this because 
the honeypot knows the responses to the requests and it knows exactly what sensor data values 
should be being transmitted. As you can see the Wearable Honeypot has met its design goals. 
 
9 Future Works 
 The project focused on making a honeypot. There are improvements that could be done 
to the design topology of the honeypot as well as to the message system. Future projects could 
expand the features and detection mechanisms of the honeypot, as well as provide attacker 
response. The Wearable Honeypot merely raises the alarm.  
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9.1 Honeypot Topology Changes 
The honeypot could be expanded to 3 or more motes (or virtualized/spoofed motes). The 
Wearable Honeypot uses 2 motes and sends many packets; if more motes are used, then each 
mote can be less active and still have the same effect (2 motes transmitting 100% of the time is 
the same amount of traffic as 3 motes 67% of the time). This could lighten the load of each 
honeypot mote. Relatedly, each member of the BAN could be part of the honeypot meaning the 
transmission load of the honeypot could be spread as much as possible. However, if that is done, 
watch out for attracting the attacker towards a mote that would have very bad consequences for 
the user if it’s targeted. 
9.2 Message System Extensions 
 The message system as it is set to transmit in a constant fashion. This rate is changeable, 
but currently there isn’t a good scheduling mechanism for changing the rate dynamically. That is 
the mote can take any rate, but the base station doesn’t have intelligence in setting it. An 
improvement would involve a more complicated schedule of transmissions where transmission is 
happening less often, but should still be able to provide the same level of security.  
9.3 Responding To Attacks 
 In terms of security and securing the BAN, responding to attacks would be most 
important. It wasn’t necessary for the purposes of this honeypot to individually recognize 
different attacks. It merely raises the alarm when an attack is detected. When responding to 
attacks it may be useful to set up different flags or some data structure to individually recognize 
all attacks. After detecting precisely which attack was launched, an appropriate response can be 
determined. This can be through a threat level mapping, where each attack it mapped to a 
security level. When the security level changes, there is different behavior in the BAN 
(stronger/weaker encryption, going radio silent temporarily, more extensive logging, etc.) 
Responses could also be individual to the attack, or some combination of both. 
 In short, there are multiple different avenues to continue this project on. These are mainly 
modifying/improving what the honeypot and responding to attacks. In particular, responding to 
attacks would improve security. Whichever road future projects take, this honeypot should be a 
usable foundation. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Bluetooth Background Info 
A.1.1 Device ID 
Every Bluetooth device has a device ID or Bluetooth Address which is used to identify it. 
The address is a 48-bit number just like an Ethernet MAC [26]. Unlike with an Ethernet MAC, a 
Bluetooth address is used at all levels, not just the physical one. In a piconet all devices transmit 
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using the masters Bluetooth address. The Bluetooth address has 3 parts: 2 bytes for the Non-
sigificant Address Portion (NAP), 1 byte for Upper Address Portion (UAP), and 3 bytes for the 
Lower Addresss Portion (LAP). They are in that order MSB to LSB. While in discoverable mode 
or in use, Bluetooth addresses are always discoverable [22]. 
A.1.2 Pairing 
Before two devices can exchange data, they must be paired. Master devices initiate 
pairing by the process shown in the Figure 25.  
 
Figure 25: Bluetooth Pairing Process 
The pairing process usually usual starts at with a user entering a PIN into a UI. The PIN 
is the basis for confirming the identity of the devices. After sending a PIN a number of keys are 
generated for Bluetooth security. The PIN is not transmitted over the wireless channel, instead it 
is used to generate a random number that becomes the basis for the authentication key. The 
initialization key is used to agree upon a link key, which depends on the type of communication 
desired. The link key is then used to generate the encryption key used for built in Bluetooth 
security [22]. The devices are officially paired at this point. 
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A.1.3 Frequency Hopping 
When a Bluetooth piconet is established from a master, there 14 channels specified for 
communication. The master transmits on the seven even channels and the slaves transmit using 
the seven odd channels. Devices hop channels every 625 microseconds [27]. When 
communicating, the master and all the slaves user the master's device ID to determine hopping 
patter and the master's clock synchronizes the hopping pattern in th epiconet. When a packet is 
being transmitted, hopping halts. After one 625 microsecond cycle if the packet is transmitted, 
then the frequency hops continue. Otherwise after 3 cycles if the packet is done channel hopping 
resumes. The maximum transmission time of a packet is only allowed to be 5 of these cycles, at 
which time frequency hopping must resume; frequency hopping may only resume after 1, 3, or 5 
cyles [27]. 
A.1.4 Bluetooth Stack 
The Bluetooth stack has 3 layers: Application, Middleware and Transport Layer. The 
application layer contains all applications on a Bluetooth ready device. The Transport Layer 
deals with both the physical and logical communication between two devices. The middle layer 
provides Bluetooth services and decides how the application layer packets get handed to the 
transport layer. This stack is depicted in Figure 26. 
Application Layer
Middleware Layer
Transport Layer
Applications
Data
Internet Protocol
Service Discovery Protocol
RFCOMM
1. L2CAP
2. Link Manager
3. Baseband
4. RF
 
Figure 26: Bluetooth Protocol Stack 
The Application layer and the Middleware layer are a set of programs that co-mingle on those 
levels of the stack. For the transport layer however,  L2CAP (Logical Link Control and 
Adaptation) interfaces with the Link Manger which deals with the logical connection between 
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devices which sits on top of the Baseband which sits on RF both of which deal with the physical 
communication. RF refers to the physical radio signals and the Baseband controls the time 
domain multiplexing of the signal. The middleware layer provides services such as TCP/IP, Data 
Transmission, Service Discover Protocol, and RFCOMM 
A.1.5 Bluetooth Security 
 Bluetooth security is meant to provide authentication, confidentiality, and authorization. 
That is verify the identify of communicating devices, maintaining communication privacy, and 
resource control by permissions. It uses a PIN for authorization (this is how authentication key is 
generated in pairing), verifying the link key is meant to verify the identity of the communication 
partner, and the encryption key is meant to keep confidentiality. 
A.1.5.1 Device ID 
 Bluetooth addresses are supposed to be globaly unique like Ethernet MAC addresses. 
This is particularly important because Bluetooth uses a broadcast medium so the communication 
target must be uniquely identified. An attacker could compile a list of Bluetooth addresses, and 
use software to change their address and iterate through the list listening for packets. When it 
finds an address with packets, sniffing and packet injection become possible [22]. This kind of 
spoofing of an attacker's own address can be very useful because using standard Bluetooth 
devices, promiscuous sniffing is not possible. This is because most Bluetooth firmware 
automatically filters out packets not meant for a particular machine [22]. Even in non-
dicoverable mode Bluetooth devices will still receive packets addresses to them. 
A.1.5.2 Pairing 
 There are security issues with the paring process. The simplest of which is if this initial 
pairing communication is eavesdropped, then an attacker would have the authentication key, the 
link key, and then encryption key rendering Bluetooth level security useless. Also, PINs, which 
are used for authorization and to initiate pairing, are often left to their default values, making the 
security measure often useless. 
A.1.5.3 Frequency Hopping & Other 
 Frequency hopping provides some barrier to sniffing, but there are ways around it by 
modifying firmware or with dedicated devices. Frequency jamming attack has been documented 
to cause devices to re-initiate pairing allowing an attacker to have the legitimate devices pair 
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with fake ones that provide the foundation for man in the middle attacks [22]. Even with 
frequency hopping piconets are susceptible to DOS attacks from inquiry scanning. Inquiry 
scanning is how Bluetooth devices discover each other. Messages of this type are sent over many 
frequencies. 
A.2 Development Issues 
A.2.1 Issues with Banmqp implementation 
1. Problem: Basestation crashing when motes added to BAN because inside mote 
constructor isStreaming = wasStreaming = false.  
1. Fix: When variables initialized separately bug went away 
1. Problem: Defined in his main menu where strings to hold sensor information that weren’t 
defined in his other xml files. 
1. Fix: Defined the strings 
2. Problem: In his main menu there was a closing tag as well that wasn’t open on that same 
row where those strings would have been displayed 
1. Fix: Added the needed ending tag 
3. Problem: Only had 8 sensor strings defined in the XML which means if you try to add 
beyond the fourth row you hit some sort of max in the code 
1. Fix: increasing max to what’s actually defined 
4. Problem: NULL Items grabbed in a for each loop (if there is a null element in a data 
structure, the for each construct shouldn’t process that) 
1. Fix: Check for NULL in every for each loop 
2. Note: There were also many null pointer exceptions pertaining to trying to process 
elements in a data structure. Where the log came up null pointer checks were 
placed. 
 
A.2.2 Development Issues 
1. Never edit the source code from the motes and the basestation simulataneously in the same 
instance of Eclipse. This will cause Eclipse to throw tons and tons of errors.  
2. On the motes whenever any configuration file is changed in any way or added to the project, 
the run configuration must be redone. It will have all the same settings as before, but a new one 
must be generated or the motes will not flash. 
A.2.3 Development Best Practices 
1. Git commit as often as possible.  
2. The only simple method to get feedback from motes is the LED, use it. 
3. To get feedback from the basestation application, usb connected android phones transmit 
system activity over the USB, visible in Eclipse w/ ADT. 
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4. The Shimmer manual explains how to program nesC for TinyOS better than the official 
documentation. 
A.3 PRNGs 
A.3.1 RC4 
A.3.1.1 Flowchart 
 
A.3.1.2 Source 
[31] 
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A.3.2 Mersenne Twister 
A.3.2.1 Flowchart 
 
A.3.2.2 Source 
// Create a length 624 array to store the state of the generator 
 int[0..623] MT 
 int index = 0 
  
 // Initialize the generator from a seed 
 function initialize_generator(int seed) { 
     index := 0 
     MT[0] := seed 
     for i from 1 to 623 { // loop over each element 
         MT[i] := lowest 32 bits of(1812433253 * (MT[i-1] xor (right shift by 30 bits(MT[i-1]))) + i) // 0x6c078965 
     }  
 } 
  
 // Extract a tempered pseudorandom number based on the index-th value, 
 // calling generate_numbers() every 624 numbers 
 function extract_number() { 
     if index == 0 { 
         generate_numbers() 
     } 
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     int y := MT[index] 
     y := y xor (right shift by 11 bits(y)) 
     y := y xor (left shift by 7 bits(y) and (2636928640)) // 0x9d2c5680 
     y := y xor (left shift by 15 bits(y) and (4022730752)) // 0xefc60000 
     y := y xor (right shift by 18 bits(y)) 
 
     index := (index + 1) mod 624 
     return y 
 } 
  
 // Generate an array of 624 untempered numbers 
 function generate_numbers() { 
     for i from 0 to 623 { 
         int y := (MT[i] and 0x80000000)                       // bit 31 (32nd bit) of MT[i] 
                        + (MT[(i+1) mod 624] and 0x7fffffff)   // bits 0-30 (first 31 bits) of MT[...] 
         MT[i] := MT[(i + 397) mod 624] xor (right shift by 1 bit(y)) 
         if (y mod 2) != 0 { // y is odd 
             MT[i] := MT[i] xor (2567483615) // 0x9908b0df 
         } 
     } 
 } 
[32] 
A.3.3 TinyMT 
A.3.3.1 Flowchart 
 
A.3.3.2 Source 
#ifndef TINYMT32_H 
#define TINYMT32_H 
/** 
 * @file tinymt32.h 
 * 
 * @brief Tiny Mersenne Twister only 127 bit internal state 
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 * 
 * @author Mutsuo Saito (Hiroshima University) 
 * @author Makoto Matsumoto (University of Tokyo) 
 * 
 * Copyright (C) 2011 Mutsuo Saito, Makoto Matsumoto, 
 * Hiroshima University and The University of Tokyo. 
 * All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * The 3-clause BSD License is applied to this software, see 
 * LICENSE.txt 
 */ 
 
#include <stdint.h> 
#include <inttypes.h> 
 
#define TINYMT32_MEXP 127 
#define TINYMT32_SH0 1 
#define TINYMT32_SH1 10 
#define TINYMT32_SH8 8 
#define TINYMT32_MASK UINT32_C(0x7fffffff) 
#define TINYMT32_MUL (1.0f / 4294967296.0f) 
 
#if defined(__cplusplus) 
extern "C" { 
#endif 
 
/** 
 * tinymt32 internal state vector and parameters 
 */ 
struct TINYMT32_T { 
    uint32_t status[4]; 
    uint32_t mat1; 
    uint32_t mat2; 
    uint32_t tmat; 
}; 
 
typedef struct TINYMT32_T tinymt32_t; 
 
void tinymt32_init(tinymt32_t * random, uint32_t seed); 
void tinymt32_init_by_array(tinymt32_t * random, uint32_t init_key[], 
       int key_length); 
 
#if defined(__GNUC__) 
/** 
 * This function always returns 127 
 * @param random not used 
 * @return always 127 
 */ 
inline static int tinymt32_get_mexp( 
    tinymt32_t * random  __attribute__((unused))) { 
    return TINYMT32_MEXP; 
} 
#else 
inline static int tinymt32_get_mexp(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    return TINYMT32_MEXP; 
} 
58 
 
#endif 
 
/** 
 * This function changes internal state of tinymt32. 
 * Users should not call this function directly. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 */ 
inline static void tinymt32_next_state(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    uint32_t x; 
    uint32_t y; 
 
    y = random->status[3]; 
    x = (random->status[0] & TINYMT32_MASK) 
 ^ random->status[1] 
 ^ random->status[2]; 
    x ^= (x << TINYMT32_SH0); 
    y ^= (y >> TINYMT32_SH0) ^ x; 
    random->status[0] = random->status[1]; 
    random->status[1] = random->status[2]; 
    random->status[2] = x ^ (y << TINYMT32_SH1); 
    random->status[3] = y; 
    random->status[1] ^= -((int32_t)(y & 1)) & random->mat1; 
    random->status[2] ^= -((int32_t)(y & 1)) & random->mat2; 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs 32-bit unsigned integer from internal state. 
 * Users should not call this function directly. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return 32-bit unsigned pseudorandom number 
 */ 
inline static uint32_t tinymt32_temper(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    uint32_t t0, t1; 
    t0 = random->status[3]; 
#if defined(LINEARITY_CHECK) 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 ^ (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#else 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 + (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#endif 
    t0 ^= t1; 
    t0 ^= -((int32_t)(t1 & 1)) & random->tmat; 
    return t0; 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * Users should not call this function directly. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (1.0 <= r < 2.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_temper_conv(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    uint32_t t0, t1; 
    union { 
 uint32_t u; 
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 float f; 
    } conv; 
 
    t0 = random->status[3]; 
#if defined(LINEARITY_CHECK) 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 ^ (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#else 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 + (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#endif 
    t0 ^= t1; 
    conv.u = ((t0 ^ (-((int32_t)(t1 & 1)) & random->tmat)) >> 9) 
       | UINT32_C(0x3f800000); 
    return conv.f; 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * Users should not call this function directly. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (1.0 < r < 2.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_temper_conv_open(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    uint32_t t0, t1; 
    union { 
 uint32_t u; 
 float f; 
    } conv; 
 
    t0 = random->status[3]; 
#if defined(LINEARITY_CHECK) 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 ^ (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#else 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 + (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#endif 
    t0 ^= t1; 
    conv.u = ((t0 ^ (-((int32_t)(t1 & 1)) & random->tmat)) >> 9) 
       | UINT32_C(0x3f800001); 
    return conv.f; 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs 32-bit unsigned integer from internal state. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return 32-bit unsigned integer r (0 <= r < 2^32) 
 */ 
inline static uint32_t tinymt32_generate_uint32(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return tinymt32_temper(random); 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
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 * This function is implemented using multiplying by 1 / 2^32. 
 * floating point multiplication is faster than using union trick in 
 * my Intel CPU. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (0.0 <= r < 1.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_generate_float(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random);  
    return tinymt32_temper(random) * TINYMT32_MUL;  
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * This function is implemented using union trick. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (1.0 <= r < 2.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_generate_float12(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return tinymt32_temper_conv(random); 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * This function is implemented using union trick. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (0.0 <= r < 1.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_generate_float01(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return tinymt32_temper_conv(random) - 1.0f; 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * This function may return 1.0 and never returns 0.0. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (0.0 < r <= 1.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_generate_floatOC(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return 1.0f - tinymt32_generate_float(random); 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * This function returns neither 0.0 nor 1.0. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (0.0 < r < 1.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_generate_floatOO(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return tinymt32_temper_conv_open(random) - 1.0f; 
} 
 
/** 
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 * This function outputs double precision floating point number from 
 * internal state. The returned value has 32-bit precision. 
 * In other words, this function makes one double precision floating point 
 * number from one 32-bit unsigned integer. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (0.0 < r <= 1.0) 
 */ 
inline static double tinymt32_generate_32double(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return tinymt32_temper(random) * (1.0 / 4294967296.0); 
} 
 
#if defined(__cplusplus) 
} 
#endif 
#endif 
 
/** 
 * @file tinymt32.c 
 * 
 * @brief Tiny Mersenne Twister only 127 bit internal state 
 * 
 * @author Mutsuo Saito (Hiroshima University) 
 * @author Makoto Matsumoto (The University of Tokyo) 
 * 
 * Copyright (C) 2011 Mutsuo Saito, Makoto Matsumoto, 
 * Hiroshima University and The University of Tokyo. 
 * All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * The 3-clause BSD License is applied to this software, see 
 * LICENSE.txt 
 */ 
#include "tinymt32.h" 
#define MIN_LOOP 8 
#define PRE_LOOP 8 
 
/** 
 * This function represents a function used in the initialization 
 * by init_by_array 
 * @param x 32-bit integer 
 * @return 32-bit integer 
 */ 
static uint32_t ini_func1(uint32_t x) { 
    return (x ^ (x >> 27)) * UINT32_C(1664525); 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function represents a function used in the initialization 
 * by init_by_array 
 * @param x 32-bit integer 
 * @return 32-bit integer 
 */ 
static uint32_t ini_func2(uint32_t x) { 
    return (x ^ (x >> 27)) * UINT32_C(1566083941); 
} 
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/** 
 * This function certificate the period of 2^127-1. 
 * @param random tinymt state vector. 
 */ 
static void period_certification(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    if ((random->status[0] & TINYMT32_MASK) == 0 && 
 random->status[1] == 0 && 
 random->status[2] == 0 && 
 random->status[3] == 0) { 
 random->status[0] = 'T'; 
 random->status[1] = 'I'; 
 random->status[2] = 'N'; 
 random->status[3] = 'Y'; 
    } 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function initializes the internal state array with a 32-bit 
 * unsigned integer seed. 
 * @param random tinymt state vector. 
 * @param seed a 32-bit unsigned integer used as a seed. 
 */ 
void tinymt32_init(tinymt32_t * random, uint32_t seed) { 
    random->status[0] = seed; 
    random->status[1] = random->mat1; 
    random->status[2] = random->mat2; 
    random->status[3] = random->tmat; 
    int i; 
    for (i = 1; i < MIN_LOOP; i++) { 
 random->status[i & 3] ^= i + UINT32_C(1812433253) 
     * (random->status[(i - 1) & 3] 
        ^ (random->status[(i - 1) & 3] >> 30)); 
    } 
    period_certification(random); 
    for (i = 0; i < PRE_LOOP; i++) { 
 tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    } 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function initializes the internal state array, 
 * with an array of 32-bit unsigned integers used as seeds 
 * @param random tinymt state vector. 
 * @param init_key the array of 32-bit integers, used as a seed. 
 * @param key_length the length of init_key. 
 */ 
void tinymt32_init_by_array(tinymt32_t * random, uint32_t init_key[], 
       int key_length) { 
    const int lag = 1; 
    const int mid = 1; 
    const int size = 4; 
    int i, j; 
    int count; 
    uint32_t r; 
    uint32_t * st = &random->status[0]; 
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    st[0] = 0; 
    st[1] = random->mat1; 
    st[2] = random->mat2; 
    st[3] = random->tmat; 
    if (key_length + 1 > MIN_LOOP) { 
 count = key_length + 1; 
    } else { 
 count = MIN_LOOP; 
    } 
    r = ini_func1(st[0] ^ st[mid % size] 
    ^ st[(size - 1) % size]); 
    st[mid % size] += r; 
    r += key_length; 
    st[(mid + lag) % size] += r; 
    st[0] = r; 
    count--; 
    for (i = 1, j = 0; (j < count) && (j < key_length); j++) { 
 r = ini_func1(st[i % size] 
        ^ st[(i + mid) % size] 
        ^ st[(i + size - 1) % size]); 
 st[(i + mid) % size] += r; 
 r += init_key[j] + i; 
 st[(i + mid + lag) % size] += r; 
 st[i % size] = r; 
 i = (i + 1) % size; 
    } 
    for (; j < count; j++) { 
 r = ini_func1(st[i % size] 
        ^ st[(i + mid) % size] 
        ^ st[(i + size - 1) % size]); 
 st[(i + mid) % size] += r; 
 r += i; 
 st[(i + mid + lag) % size] += r; 
 st[i % size] = r; 
 i = (i + 1) % size; 
    } 
    for (j = 0; j < size; j++) { 
 r = ini_func2(st[i % size] 
        + st[(i + mid) % size] 
        + st[(i + size - 1) % size]); 
 st[(i + mid) % size] ^= r; 
 r -= i; 
 st[(i + mid + lag) % size] ^= r; 
 st[i % size] = r; 
 i = (i + 1) % size; 
    } 
    period_certification(random); 
    for (i = 0; i < PRE_LOOP; i++) { 
 tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    } 
} 
 
 
 
/* This one was changed for our purposes 
 * main.c 
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 */ 
/** 
 * @file check32.c 
 * 
 * @brief Simple check program for tinymt32 
 * 
 * @author Mutsuo Saito (Hiroshima University) 
 * @author Makoto Matsumoto (The University of Tokyo) 
 * 
 * Copyright (C) 2011 Mutsuo Saito, Makoto Matsumoto, 
 * Hiroshima University and University of Tokyo. 
 * All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * The 3-clause BSD License is applied to this software, see 
 * LICENSE.txt 
 */ 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdint.h> 
#include <inttypes.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include "tinymt32.h" 
 
int main(int argc, char * argv[]) { 
    tinymt32_t tinymt; 
    tinymt.mat1 = (uint32_t) 0xEFEFEFEF; 
    tinymt.mat2 = (uint32_t) 0x12345678; 
    tinymt.tmat = (uint32_t) 0xABCDEF12; 
    uint32_t seed = 0x1321FBCA; 
    tinymt32_init(&tinymt, seed); 
    tinymt32_generate_floatOC(&tinymt); // float between 0 and 1; 
    return 0; 
} 
 
 
[30] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
